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Abstract
We distinguish dierent senses in which an explanation can be more or less
abstract, and we analyse the connection between explanations’ abstractness and
their explanatory power. According to our analysis abstract non-causal, mathemat-
ical explanations have much in common with counterfactual causal explanations.
This opposes a clear recent trend to regard abstractions as explanatory in some sui
generis way.
1 Introduction
On my view, explanation is epistemic, but with a solid metaphysical basis. A
realist theory of explanation that links the determinative (or dependency) rela-
tions in the world with explanation gets at the intuitively acceptable idea that
we explain something by showing what is responsible for it or what makes it as
it is. This is what, in the end, explains explanation. [Ruben, 1990, 233]
There is broad agreement that many explanations derive their explanatory power
from information about dependence. Causal explanations are typically understood in
terms of causal dependence, and many have suggested that various kinds of non-causal
explanations could be similarly understood in terms of non-causal dependence of the
explanandum on the explanans.1 It is reasonable to hypothesize that all explanations
involve information about what the explanandum (causally or non-causally) depends
on. This hypothesis, to the extent it is tenable, could be part of a unified account of
explanations, according to which all explanations—causal or otherwise—are explanatory
due to providing information about dependences.
A consideration against this hypothesis comes from explanatory abstractions. Expla-
nations vary in how abstract they are: some explanations appeal to relatively abstract
features of reality, whereas others turn on much less abstract explanans.2 We value
explanatory abstraction, when appropriate: it filters out details that are in some way ir-
relevant to the explanation in question. But abstraction does not directly concern what
∗This work is the result of an equal collaboration. We list the authors alphabetically.
1See e.g. Woodward [2003], Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b], Ylikoski and Kuorikoski [2010],
Strevens [2008]. Ruben [1990] is an early proponent.
2Contrast an explanation that turns on abstract topological features of space—e.g. its orientability—to
an explanation that turns on a specific concrete feature of an event’s causal history.
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the explanandum depends on. Rather, abstraction is about a kind of independence of
the explanandum from the irrelevant details. And one may be tempted to think, along
with various recent authors, that this information about independence is where the ex-
planatoriness of many abstract explanations lies. This mode of explaining, by reference
to what is irrelevant to the explanandum, can seem sui generis, dierent in kind from
explanations in terms of dependences.
We will argue that explanatory abstractions do not point to a sui generis mode of
explaining. They do not call us to revise the idea that explanatory power is a maer
of providing information about what the explanandum depends on (and the more the
beer), and there is no need to abandon the hope for a unified account of explanatory
power. In saying this we stand against a clear trend that urges the opposite: that some
abstract explanations do not fit an account of explanatory power that is focused on (non-
)causal dependence.3 More specifically, we aim to (i) undercut prominent arguments
exhibiting the trend against a unified account of explanatory power; (ii) to present such
a unified account, capable of capturing influential exemplars of abstract explanations
that have motivated the anti-unificationist trend; and (iii) to provide an argument for
our unified account.4
Before we get to the niy-griy, let us illustrate explanatory abstraction by a simple
example, and sketch some of the points that we will develop in the paper. The expla-
nation of why Mother fails to divide her twenty-three strawberries equally among her
three children (without cuing any strawberries) turns on the fact that twenty-three is
not evenly divisible by three.5 It would make for a worse explanation to cite the causal
details or the causal laws involved in Mother’s aempt, or the specific physical consti-
tution of the strawberries. The explanation is independent of any such details; the ex-
planatory mathematical facts hold irrespective of contingent causal laws and details. So
where does the explanatory power associated with mathematics come from? It’s not at
all clear that mathematical facts capture dependence relations between numbers that are
in any way analogous to contingent causal and nomological connections. It is tempting
to think that the explanatory contribution of mathematics in this case cannot be cap-
tured in terms of dependences. Instead, one may think that mathematics’ explanatory
contribution is sui generis, that it somehow turns on mathematics’ independence from
the details of the physical constitution and the causal laws. (Later in the paper we will
explicate and rebut dierent versions of this intuition.)
We see lile reason to shi focus from dependence to independence in analysing
abstract mathematical explanations of this kind. It is easy to overlook the wealth of
information about dependence that we take for granted in this case. The explanation
does not just tell us that Mother must fail to divide the strawberries evenly, as a maer
of mathematical necessity. It also tells us what the failure depends on—the number of
3See e.g Lange [2013], Pincock [2007], Pincock [2015], Baerman and Rice [2014]. (We include Pincock
[2015] here since he argues that none of the existing accounts with their focus on dependence can be
extended to capture highly abstract explanations.
4By calling ours a ‘unified’ account we do not pretend to show that it captures all causal and non-causal
explanations. Rather, we claim that it captures those prominent and influential exemplars of non-causal
explanation that we discuss in this paper. Whether some other non-causal explanation fits our thinking
would have to be looked at on a case-by-case basis.
5This example is from Lange [2013], who credits the inspiration for the case to Braine [1972].
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strawberries—and exactly how it depends on this feature. For example, if Mother had two
fewer strawberries or one strawberry more, then she could have succeeded in dividing
them evenly among her three children. This change relating what-if-things-had-been-
dierent information is exactly the kind associated with explanatory dependence.6 We
will argue, furthermore, that this information is doing all the explanatory work.
The importance of dependence information can be gauged by varying its amount
while keeping other things fixed. Consider removing it altogether, first of all. That is,
let us pretend that we can remove all information about dependence that relies on the
background arithmetical knowledge, only retaining the information about the indepen-
dence of the explanandum from causal laws and so on. If all we know is that as a maer
of mathematical necessity Mother’s aempt with twenty-three strawberries must fail,
so that we are unable to answer any questions about under what changes the aempt
would succeed, then it is unclear whether we have any explanation of Mother’s failure.
Consider, now, adding just a lile bit of information about dependence. That is, pre-
tend that instead of being able to use our general understanding of arithmetic, we only
get to know that Mother could have succeeded with twenty-four strawberries. Assume
that is all the information we have, on top of knowing that twenty-three is not divisible
by three. Here we may have an explanation, but it looks like a very thin one. Yet, in terms
of independence from particular causal laws, processes, and microphysical conditions,
it is on a par with the general explanation that appeals to our background arithmetical
knowledge. If the explanation that makes use of our background arithmetical knowledge
derives its explanatory power (partly) from its great independence from physical details
and laws, then we would expect the modified explanation to be explanatory to a com-
mensurate degree. Yet, we do not see this. When we vary the amount of information
about dependence, we also seem to vary the degree of explanatoriness, in a way that
suggests that it has lile to do with independence information.
To carefully develop the line of thought sketched above, we first need to lay some
conceptual groundwork. We will do this by distinguishing three dierent dimensions
of abstraction (§2). We will then show how these distinctions apply to some prominent
recent conceptions of explanatory abstractions (§3). Our key claim is that not all ‘di-
mensions’ of abstraction are responsible for explanatoriness, even if good explanations
are typically abstract along several dimensions. Based on the conceptual distinctions
between three dierent dimensions of abstraction we will present an alternative coun-
terfactual account of the explanatoriness of abstract explanations (§4). This allows for a
unified conception of explanation, in tune with the spirit (but not the leer) of the depen-
dency oriented account developed by Woodward [2003] and Woodward and Hitchcock
[2003a,b]. The virtues of this account are illustrated by revisiting a graph-theoretic expla-
nation of Königsberg’s bridges (§5) and further underlined in relation to other challenges
faced by the less unified views of explanation (§6).
6Most prominently in Woodward [2003].
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2 Three dimensions of abstraction
As said, we will challenge the idea that explanatoriness turns on independence of the ex-
planation from the particular physical laws, processes, or concrete physical structures.
Yet, we think that abstract explanations typically do exhibit this kind of independence.
The task of this section is to distinguish three conceptually dierent ways in which ex-
planations can be abstract. They will all involve independence in one sense or another.
However, we will later argue that only one kind of independence carries information
about explanatory dependence, and, as a consequence, contributes to explanatory power.
Let us recall some simple examples of abstract, plausibly non-causal, mathemati-
cal explanations in order to bring out intuitions about dierent senses of explanatory
abstraction.7 The following examples have featured prominently in recent philosophi-
cal analyses: (1) Economical bees build hexagonal honeycombs because this is the most
resource-eicient way to divide a Euclidean plane into regions of equal area with least to-
tal perimeter [Lyon and Colyvan, 2008]. (2) Plateau’s laws hold for soap film geometry,
because this geometry minimizes the system’s energy by minimizing the surface area
[Lyon, 2012, Pincock, 2015]. (3) Königsberg cannot be toured by crossing each and every
bridge exactly once because of the bridges’ relational configuration [Pincock, 2007]. (4)
The strawberry case discussed above is another example, of course.
These are paradigmatic exemplars of what we call ‘abstract explanations’. (We will
focus on (3) and (4) in our main discussion, covering (1) and (2) in the Appendix.) Ab-
stract explanations hinge on (relatively) abstract features of reality that are non-causal
(or perhaps causal in a very broad sense of ’causal’). This abstractness is obviously partly
a maer of relative independence of the explanans from the actual physical structure of
the entities involved: strawberries, bridges, soap films, honeycombs, etc. This is the first
intuitive aspect of explanatory abstraction that we wish to highlight. There is nothing
special about the physical nature of strawberries, for example, that makes them indi-
visible in this way. The very same explanation essentially explains why twenty-three
marbles (say) cannot be thus evenly divided. The strawberry explanation abstracts away
from whatever concrete features need to be in place in order for there to be a set of
twenty-three individuals that can be divided into mutually exclusive and collectively ex-
haustive subsets.
A second, more radical aspect of abstraction pertains to the fact that the explana-
tions above are independent from the actual laws of nature that underlie the physical
processes presupposed by the why-question: the processes of group division, bridge
crossing, or comb building, for example. There is nothing special, as far as these ex-
planations are concerned, about the actual physics that underlies the solidity of honey-
comb walls, strawberries, or bridges. The same explanations would work just the same
in more exotic, counter-legal possible worlds where the underlying physical laws are
rather dierent (assuming the relevant why-questions still make sense). The explanation
of Plateau’s laws, for example, transcends the nomologically possible causes or grounds
of the area-minimizing action of soap bubbles. This explanation is modally robust with
7It is a maer of an on-going debate whether these explanations are undeniably non-causal, as opposed
to being causal in some very broad, non-paradigmatic sense (dio regarding their status qua ‘mathematical’
explanations). Our concerns in this paper are independent of these debates.
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respect to variation in the underlying physical laws, as long as the laws still give rise to
area-minimizing action for some surfaces. To this extent the explanation abstracts away
from the actual nomological facts pertaining to the systems in question.
So far we have identified a conceptual distinction between two senses of abstraction.
There is also a third aspect of abstraction in the above explanations; one that is more
easily missed. This has to do with the explanatory regularities involved, and the degree
to which an explanatory generalisation is independent from the actual value of an ex-
planans variable. For example, the fact that twenty-three is not evenly divisible by three
is but an instance of the more general fact that no integer apart from whole multiples
of three is evenly divisible by three. In as far as we judge that the explanatory work is
really done by this more general arithmetical background knowledge, we can say that
essentially the same explanation would answer the question of why Mother would have
failed had she had twenty-two strawberries (or why she could have succeeded had she
had twenty-one). The explanation turns on a regularity about numbers that is robust
by virtue of allowing the same explanation to be given for a wide range of alternative
numbers of strawberries. The wider this range is, the more abstract the explanation, in
this third sense of abstraction.
The above three intuitive aspects of explanatory abstraction all clearly have some-
thing in common. Namely, each involves a way in which an explanation can eectively
be independent from some feature of the system in question. This independence is nat-
urally thought of as follows. An explanation can cover a range of possible systems. Ex-
planatory abstraction is a maer of independence of the explanation from the details
of ‘realization’. In the above cases of abstract explanations the extent of unnecessary
details omied is striking. Consider the Königsberg case, for instance: the explanation is
independent of all the physical and geometrical features of the bridges and the crossing
processes, and of the underlying nomological facts pertaining to the bridges and their
possible crossings, only relying on a very high-level global structural feature associated
with a wide-ranging explanatory regularity. (We will make this more precise later in the
paper.)
The extent of such independence is most striking in the case of abstract explanations,
but more or less any explanation actually exhibits the three dimensions of abstraction
to some degree. Consider the mundane case of gravitational pendulums, for instance.
Why is the period of a given (more or less) ‘ideal’ pendulum 10 seconds? Explaining this
causally, in terms of its length l and gravitational acceleration g, relies on a law-like reg-
ularity that supports the same explanation in a range of possible cases that vary in these
two parameters. (The third dimension of abstraction, above.) Furthermore, the explana-
tion can apply just the same regardless of whether the underlying nomological facts are
rooted in a classical Newtonian world with gravitational force acting at a distance, or
whether the pendulum occupies a general relativistic world with gravity being a mani-
festation of curved spacetime. (The second dimension above.) Finally, the why-question
presupposes that the pendulum cord is inextensible, but the explanation is independent
from whatever microstructural facts underlie this property. (The first dimension above.)
We see the dierence between this mundane causal explanation and ‘abstract explana-
tions’ as one of degree, not of kind.
The notion of explanatory abstraction as a maer of independence is clearly a modal
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notion: it concerns the range of possible systems covered by the explanation. Dierent
aspects of explanatory abstraction have to do with dierent dimensions of modal varia-
tion with respect to these possible systems. We can think of possible systems that vary
from the actual explanandum only in the (nomologically) possible physical structures
of the entities involved; possible systems that vary in the microphysical or dynamical
laws they obey; possible systems that vary from the actual explanandum by varying a
variable that explicitly features in the explanatory regularity employed. Although modal
variation along these dierent dimensions is oen interlinked and metaphysically inter-
twined in complex ways, the dimensions themselves are conceptually independent.8 In
the strawberry case, thinking about the explanatory regularity with respect to a sys-
tem of twenty-three vs. twenty-five strawberries, one need not think about variation in
the physical structures of these entities or the division processes. Similarly, in thinking
about the explanation with respect to systems that vary in the physical structures of the
entities to be divided, one need not think of variation in their number, or of counter-legal
possibilities where the underlying physical laws are dierent. And vice versa.
Oen abstract non-causal and mathematical explanations—like the ones above—
exhibit a striking level of abstraction in each of the three senses. We believe this has
confounded some recent commentators. If one thinks, prima facie, that abstraction in a
particular sense is the source of explanatoriness, it is all too easy to find corroborating
evidence when so many good explanations are highly abstract in that sense. Now that
we have conceptually separated the dierent dimensions of abstraction, however, we
can ask: If explanatory abstraction has something to do with explanatory power (as is
commonly accepted), exactly which dimension(s) of abstraction can contribute to it?
In its full generality, we cannot hope to comprehensively answer this question in
a single paper. There is, however, a narrower question that we can answer. It is com-
monly agreed that explanation (and the associated notion of explanatory power) has
both worldly and pragmatic/communicative aspects.9 Here, we will largely set aside the
communicative and pragmatic aspects. This is not because we think that there are no
such desiderata associated with explanation.10 What is at stake in the debate at hand,
however, is whether abstract explanations require facts about independence to function
as a source of explanatory power, instead of (or in addition to) facts about dependence.
In particular, are facts about independence a worldly underpinning of explanatory power
for the paradigmatic cases in the literature (mentioned above)? Our first aim is to un-
dermine prominent recent arguments that answer ‘yes’ to the last question.
Our second aim is, more positively, to show how these abstract explanations can be
accommodated in more unified terms, in the spirit of the counterfactual account de-
veloped by Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] (the W-H account). According to the
W-H account, explanations provide a particular kind of information about dependence.
8The dimensions are metaphysically intertwined because, for example, various possible changes in the
physical laws are bound to imply changes in the physical structures.
9Some, for example van Fraassen [1977, 1980] and Faye [2014], take explanation to be solely prag-
matic/communicative. This is not the case with most of the recent commentators on explanatory abstrac-
tions.
10Some of the dimensions of depth discussed by Woodward and Hitchcock [2003b] are best understood
as pragmatic/communicative. So are some of the criteria listed by Ylikoski and Kuorikoski [2010].
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This account associates explanatoriness essentially with our third dimension of abstrac-
tion. (Roughly, an explanatory generalisation that has a broader range under which we
can vary the values of the variables provides more explanatory information about the
dependence of the explanandum on these variables than a corresponding explanatory
generalisation with a more restricted range of invariance.) This is in sharp contrast to
recent claims according to which (some) abstract explanations explain either (i) by virtue
of abstracting away from all the concrete physical features of the system in question (our
first dimension above), or (ii) by virtue of abstracting away from the underlying laws of
nature (our second dimension). The W-H account is well liked in connection with vari-
ous causal explanations (even amongst the advocates of alternative analyses of abstract
explanations), but there has been resistance to extending this counterfactual account
to abstract explanations that are (plausibly) non-causal or mathematical. We will argue
that this resistance is entirely unnecessary. Issues concerning explanatory power and
its relation to abstraction are tractable in very natural terms in the spirit of the W-H
account also for abstract explanations, aer the key notions of this account are appro-
priately clarified and refined.
We will next critically review some recent claims regarding explanatory abstraction,
questioning the intuitions that support them. Aer that we will more systematically
discuss the third dimension of abstraction, which has a beer claim to be associated
with the source of explanatory power than either dimension one or two.
3 Explanatory power and independence
Various philosophers have recently argued (in dierent ways) for the disunity of ex-
planatoriness by pointing to the sui generis role of abstraction as a source of explana-
tory power. We will focus on two authors who particularly clearly associate explana-
tory power with either the independence from concrete physical details (dimension one
above), or the independence from the particular laws (dimension two above).
Pincock [2007, 257] brought the Königsberg bridge example into philosophical promi-
nence by identifying it as an ‘abstract explanation’ that ‘appeals primarily to the formal
relational features of a physical system.’ Relational features that are ‘formal’ are clearly
meant to stand apart from causal relations. Furthermore, regarding the explanation of
the impossibility of touring the town by crossing each and every bridge exactly once,
Pincock [2007, 259] accounts:
[A]n explanation for this is that at least one vertex [in the formal graph
structure instantiated by the bridges] has an odd valence. Whenever such
a physical system has at least one bank or island with an odd number of
bridges from it, there will be no path that crosses every bridge exactly once
and that returns to the starting point. If the situation were slightly dierent
[so that] the valence of the vertices were to be all even, then there would be
a path of the desired kind.
This is all surely correct. The question is how to capture this explanation in philo-
sophical terms. Pincock [2007, 260] intimates that the explanation critically turns on
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abstraction:11
The abstract explanation seems superior [to a microphysical explanation]
because it gets at the root cause of why walking a certain path is impossible
by focusing on the abstract structure of system. Even if the bridges were
turned into gold, it would still have the structure of the same graph, and so
the same abstract explanation would apply. By abstracting away from the
microphysics, scientists can oen give beer explanations of the features of
physical systems.
The notion of ‘abstracting away from the microphysics’ is naturally construed as being
along the first dimension identified above: a maer of relative independence of the ex-
planans from the physical structure of the entities involved. As Pincock [2011, 213] puts
it: ‘the explanatory power [in this case] is tied to the simple way in which the model
abstracts from the irrelevant details of the target system.’ The intuition is that the ex-
planation comes from stripping away as irrelevant all the physical details pertaining to
the bridges’ make-up, length, location, angles, et cetera, thereby highlighting what is
relevant, namely the formal ‘mathematical structure found in the target system itself’
Pincock [2011, 213].12
We can see Pincock’s intuition, but we are unable to see a good reason for viewing
this as a sui generis ‘abstract explanation’. The explanation is undeniably highly abstract
and plausibly non-causal. But the notion that good explanations only provide relevant
information, leaving out unnecessary details, is common ground with dependence ac-
counts of explanation. According to dependence accounts one ought to provide suitable
information about what the explanandum depends on, and one also ought not to claim
(or imply) that the explanation depends on something that it does not. The leaving out
of irrelevant detail is insuicient to motivate the view that ‘abstract explanations’ are
sui generis in the way Pincock regards them.
How about the notion that the explanatorily relevant features of Königsberg are
‘formal-cum-mathematical’? Does this motivate a departure from familiar counterfac-
tual accounts of explanation? We do not think so. We do not regard the explanans
inherently formal or mathematical in any substantial sense. The explanation involves
applied mathematics; it is not an intra-mathematical explanation. There is a clear sense
in which the explanans is just concerned with how many bridges there are to/from each
of the ‘islands’. It is unclear why the ‘valence’ of an island—there being an even or odd
number of bridges to/from it—is not a high-level physical feature of it. And similarly
for the yet more abstract feature of there being at least one odd ‘island’ in the whole
system of many ‘islands’. Furthermore, there seems to be a clear and straightforward
sense in which the explanandum at stake depends on these arguably high-level physical
features: the explanation tells us how the explanandum would change if there were a dif-
ferent number of bridges (as Pincock himself notes; see the first quote above). Whether
11Pincock [2007] does not endeavour to develop a detailed account of the abstract explanation. This is
given in Pincock [2015].
12Similarly Baerman [2010, 3] argues, in relation to other kinds of mathematical and non-causal expla-
nations, that explanatory power is connected to a ‘systematic throwing away of various causal and physical
details’.
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this explanatory dependence is causal or not is neither here nor there for the prospects of
sticking to the core idea of the W-H account of explanation: explanatoriness is ultimately
a maer of telling us what the explanandum depends on.13 When it comes to identifying
the worldly source of explanatory power, we have not yet been given a reason to think
that in the Königsberg case explanatoriness derives (even partly) from the independence
of the explanandum from some worldly features.
Let us now move on to consider Lange’s [2013] analysis of the explanatory power of
the cited abstract explanations (as ‘distinctly mathematical’).14 Lange [2013, 486–488]
argues that his analysis of these explanations reveals ‘a fundamental dierence’ between
causal explanation and abstract non-causal explanation, and its significance ‘lies in what
it reveals about the kinds of scientific explanations there are’. Abstract explanations,
Lange argues, explain not by supplying information about the world’s network of causal
relations but by ‘showing how the fact to be explained was inevitable to a stronger de-
gree than could result from the causal powers [actually] bestowed by the possession of
various properties.’ This is a nod towards Wesley Salmon’s ‘modal conception’ of scien-
tific explanations, according to which such explanations ‘do their jobs by showing that
what did happen had to happen’ [Salmon, 1985, 293]. As Lange [2013, 505] puts it:
[They explain] not by describing the world’s actual causal structure, but
rather by showing how the explanandum arises from the framework that
any possible causal structure must inhabit, where the ‘possible’ causal struc-
tures extend well beyond those that are logically consistent with all of the
actual natural laws there happen to be.
In this way Lange relates explanatoriness of abstract explanations to information
about the independence of the explanandum from some contingent features of the system
in question. In contrast to Pincock, the critical sense of independence for Lange is in the
direction of the second dimension of abstraction identified above: abstraction away from
the actual laws underlying the features of the system presupposed in the context of the
relevant why-question. In relation to the Königsberg case, for instance, Lange [2013,
505-506] writes:
[The] explanation of the repeated failure to cross the Königsberg bridges
shows that it cannot be done (where this impossibility is stronger than phys-
ical impossibility) [. . . ] The explanans consists not only of various mathe-
matically necessary facts, but also [. . . ] of various contingent facts presup-
posed by the why question that the explanandum answers, such as that the
arrangement of bridges and islands is fixed. The distinctively mathematical
13Aer heavily emphasising the idiosyncratic features of abstract explanations Pincock [2015] suggests
that it may be possible to provide a unified account in terms of dependence. The idea is that in addition
to causal dependence there may be a dependency relation captured by the relation of a concrete entity
instantiating an abstract entity. We find it diicult to see how a concrete entity is an instance of an abstract
entity in analogy to the type-token distinction—Pincock’s explication of the dependence relation. More
importantly, Pincock’s [2015] notion of dependence is not in the spirit of the W-H account, to which Pincock
objects for a somewhat technical reason. We will address this objection In section §4.
14The term ‘distinctly mathematical’ is a term of art in Lange [2013]. It is aiming to capture many of the
cases that Pincock [2015] would call ‘highly abstract’.
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explanation shows it to be necessary (in a way that no particular force law
is) that, under these contingent conditions, the bridges are not crossed.
Lange’s account thus emphasizes the way in which the actual physical laws do not
come into play in explanations such as this. Undoubtedly Lange is right to note that the
sense of abstraction at play goes beyond the first dimension concerning the irrelevance
of nomologically possible physical realizations of the contingent features presupposed
in the context of the why-question. The same explanation would work, in the same way
and to same extent, in a far removed possible world with alien properties and laws—as
long as there is a system with ‘traversible bridges’ for which the why-question makes
sense.
But, having said that, why should we regard this sense of abstraction as a source of
explanatoriness in connection with abstract explanations? The answer to this question
is surprisingly diicult to find in Lange [2013].15 There is lile to directly motivate this,
beyond the commonplace idea that good explanations do not mention irrelevant details,
which in this case include all causal laws. Yet again, the idea that good explanations only
provide relevant information, leaving out unnecessary details, is common ground with
any account according to which we ought to provide information about dependence,
and we ought not to claim (or imply) that the explanandum depends on something that
it does not. Thus, the independence from the actual laws seems insuicient in itself to
motivate the view that abstract ‘mathematical’ explanations are sui generis in the way
Lange regards them.
Both Lange and Pincock are contrasting their views to causal accounts of explana-
tion. It is natural, therefore, to take them to provide a competing account of the worldly
source of explanatory power.16 So far we have undermined broad motivations for think-
ing that abstract explanations require a source of explanatory power that is not cen-
tred on dependence. Our view is that two of the three dimensions of abstraction—even
though undeniably exhibited by abstract explanations—do not actually provide a source
of explanatoriness.17 The problem is that these dimensions of abstraction do not pro-
15Lange’s motivations are best understood in the broader context of his related views on other kinds of
non-causal explanations (e.g. Lange [2015]), and on the modal metaphysics of laws of nature in general
[Lange, 2009]. Like other philosophical views, Lange’s account of abstract explanations can gain indirect
support from being a coherent part of a ‘bigger picture’. Here we do not wish to assess the pros and cons of
this bigger picture; we will focus, rather, on what can be said to directly motivate (or otherwise) Lange’s as-
sociation of explanatoriness with the second dimension of abstraction in connection with the paradigmatic
examples of abstract explanations.
16Causal accounts typically also require relevance constraints (cf. Strevens [2008]).
17This is not to say that they can never be relevant to any aspect of having a good explanation. To only
provide relevant information (and to not include irrelevant information) is a shared commitment of any
account of explanation. No maer what the source of explanatory power is taken to be. This goes some
way towards explaining the intuition that dimension one and two provide a separate source of explanatory
power. For example, if we assume that we begin with a mistaken belief that the island taken as a starting
point was relevant to explaining the failure to complete a round-tour of Königsberg, then it would have
been informative and enlightening to find out that the starting island is irrelevant. However, a dependence
account can easily capture this intuition. The failure to complete a round-tour of Königsberg does not
depend on the starting island. A good explanation cannot cite misinformation about the dependences.
Note that the intuition that this kind of information about independence is a source of explanatory power
disappears once we are not focusing on a case of correcting a mistaken belief about dependences. We are
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vide information about explanatory dependence. In the rest of the paper we will discuss
this notion of explanatory dependence and how it connects to the third dimension of
abstraction.
But before we move on, let us address a natural worry. It may seem that dependence
and independence are conceptually so closely connected that we cannot cleanly separate
the two. In particular, any information about independence is also information about
dependence: ‘E is independent from A’ means that ‘E does not depend on A’, and if
we assume that an explanandumE depends on something, then ‘E is independent from
A’ entails (and gives us the information) that ‘E depends on something else than A’.
It is thus the case, the worry goes, that information about independence along every
dimension of abstraction can provide information about dependence.
In response, we simply note that it is not true that information about independence
ipso facto provides information about dependence that is explanatory—that is, depen-
dence information in the W-H sense. It is undeniably true that one provides what-if-
things-had-been-dierent information, broadly speaking, by showing that even if the
laws of nature were dierent Mother could not divide twenty-three strawberries equally
among three children. (What if things had been dierent with respect to laws of nature?
Then Mother would have failed just the same!) But this is not the sort of what-if-things-
had-been-dierent information that counts as explanatory in the counterfactual frame-
work that we favour, according to which only what we call change relating counterfactual
information counts as explanatory.18 To understand Mother’s failure, we need to be able
to say under what conditions Mother could have succeeded. We now move on to discuss
this framework.
4 Abstraction in a counterfactual framework
The starting idea of the W-H account is that explanation ‘is a maer of exhibiting sys-
tematic paerns of counterfactual dependence’ (Woodward [2003, 192]). To develop this
into a theory of explanation, we need to say more precisely exactly which paerns of
counterfactual dependence maer for explanation. On the W-H account this is done by
focusing on modal information that allows one to answer questions about how the ex-
planandum would have been dierent under a special type of change in the explanans
[Woodward, 2003, 192]. The changes in the explanans that are relevant are those that
result from interventions on the explanans variable(s) (with respect to the explanandum
variable). The notion of intervention is technical; it plays the role of ruling out changes
in the explanans variable that are brought about by (i) changes in the explanandum
variable, and (ii) changes to some other (‘common cause’) variable that changes the ex-
planandum variable independently of the explanans variable.
This approach has a number of aractive features. First, it is natural to take relations
(whether these are nomological, causal, or mathematical) that are explanatory to be ca-
not tempted to regard as explanatory the information that failure to complete the tour is independent of
the fact that the bridges are made of stone and not wood. We never mistakenly believed that the failure to
complete the tour depended on these features.
18In the terminology of Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] an explanatory generalisation must be in-
variant under at least one testing intervention.
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pable of providing some sort of modal information. Second, by requiring more specifi-
cally that the modal information relates to dierent possible states of the explanandum—
how the actual explanandum would have been dierent had the explanans been dierent—
the account captures the natural idea that explanatory information is information about
worldly dependences. In the W-H account the critical modal notion of dependence gets
carefully cashed out in causal terms through the notion of a (testing) intervention. This
allows one to rule out backtracking counterfactuals—for example, ‘had the period of the
pendulum been dierent, then the length of the pendulum would have been dierent’—
as providing the right dependences. The focus on what-if-things-had-been-dierent
questions that concern changes in the target explanandum also provides a clear con-
trast to mere subsumption under modal regularities in the spirit of the DN account of
explanation. Third, this focus on interventions squares well with much of our experi-
mental practice; we oen manipulate systems in order to discover information about
their explanatory causal structures. Fourth, the account is, as Woodward and Hitchcock
[2003a,b] discuss at length, very well suited to capture not only what it takes to have
an explanation, but also what makes an explanation beer or worse. Having an expla-
nation is a maer of having the right information about the dependences, and the more
the beer.
The W-H account separates an explanans into two parts: a specification of an invari-
ant explanatory generalisation and a specification of the actual values of the variables
in the explanatory generalisation.19
For a simple illustration, let us look at the explanation of the period of a simple grav-
itational pendulum. Let us assume that we want to explain the fact that the period T
takes the value t1 (our explanandum M ) by using the simple pendulum law. In terms
of the W-H account, we have an explanatory generalisation T ≈ 2pi
√
l
g . The explanans
consists of this generalisation and in a specification of the actual values of l and g. In or-
der to have an explanation on the W-H account, the simple pendulum law has to (at least
approximately) correctly give the actual value of the period as t1 under an intervention
that fixes the values of l and g to the actual values. Moreover, the simple pendulum law
must capture (in at least one case) how the period would change under at least one (and
ideally more) interventions that change(s) the length or the gravitational acceleration.
It thus captures the dependence of the explanandum on these variables.
Now we are in a position to make the contrast between the dierent dimensions of
abstraction more precise. Let us take the first dimension of abstraction first. In the con-
text of the simple pendulum explanation, we can ask whether the explanandum T = t1
is independent of particular background conditions which are in some sense part of the
system but not represented as variables in the explanatory generalisation T ≈ 2pi
√
l
g .
We can think of the microphysical features that make the pendulum cord inextensi-
ble, for example, or the mass of the bob, and so on. The degree of independence of the
explanation from such background conditions was the focus of the first dimension of
abstraction. (In contrast to such ‘internal’ background conditions there are other back-
ground conditions that are external to the system and clearly irrelevant, such as, the bob
being made in Japan, the exchange rate of the US dollar to the Malaysian ringgit, the
19See Woodward [2003, 203] for a detailed account.
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colour of the shirt of the person seing the bob in motion, etc.)
In the second dimension of abstraction, we considered the degree of independence of
the explanation from the actual laws of nature. In the context of the pendulum example,
we can ask whether we can vary the actual laws of nature and still expect the simple
pendulum explanation to apply. We can alter many of the laws of, for example, elec-
tromagnetism, without aecting the explanation, provided that those alterations do not
run afoul of the assumptions presupposed in the context of the why-question, for exam-
ple, the cord being nearly inextensible. As mentioned earlier, we can also alter many of
the fundamental aspects of gravitational acceleration, such as whether its nomological
basis is an action at a distance eect or a manifestation of curved space-time.
Finally, in the third dimension of abstraction, we consider the range of conditions di-
rectly relevant to changes in the variables in the explanatory generalisation, T ≈ 2pi
√
l
g
such that the simple pendulum explanation of the period holds. For example, we could
decrease g by, say, moving the pendulum to a higher altitude or to the moon, and we
could change the length of the pendulum, and yet, the explanation of the period would
work in just the same way. On the W-H account, abstractness in this dimension is just
a maer of the invariance of the explanatory generalisation, ‘measured’ by the range of
alternative values of variables l and g for which the generalisation holds and is change
relating.
So far we have simply described the W-H account. Before we can apply these ideas to
the paradigmatic examples of abstract explanations, we need to extend and refine some
of them. In particular, the W-H account was developed as an account of causal expla-
nation, while the abstract explanations we are interested in are plausibly non-causal. As
we move beyond causal explanation, we can no longer appeal to the exact understand-
ing of the relevant class of explanatory counterfactuals that Woodward and Hitchcock
use. They delineate the class of relevant counterfactuals in terms of the causal notion
of intervention: explanatory counterfactuals describe the eect of a testing interven-
tion. These counterfactuals are underwrien by contingent explanatory generalisations,
and the eects of surgical testing interventions are naturally understood as concerning
causal dependences. In the non-causal cases this notion of causal dependence becomes
inapplicable or unnatural, because the notion of causal intervention is inapplicable, or
because the counterfactuals are not underwrien by contingent laws of nature (but,
rather, by logic or mathematics, or metaphysical truths).20 Is it still possible in these
cases to characterise explanatory dependences in counterfactual terms?
The answer is yes; we have analogous explanatory dependences in the non-causal
situations involving Mother’s strawberries, Königsberg’s bridges, etc.21 We have a good
20In Mother’s case, for example, changing the number of strawberries may count as an intervention.
But its ‘eect’—rendering the set divisible-by-three, say—is not causally related to this intervention, but is
rather more intimately connected to it. In the Königsberg case, it is not clear to us exactly which changes
of bridge configuration even count as interventions, to begin with.
21[Woodward, 2003, 221] notes passingly that it seems natural to extend the account to non-causal ex-
planations, but he does not develop it further.
[T]he common element in many forms of explanation, both causal and noncausal, is that
they must answer what-if-things-had-been-dierent questions. . . .When a theory or deriva-
tion answers a what-if-things-had-been-dierent question but we cannot interpret this as
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grasp of what it means to change the explanans, and how the explanandum depends
on these changes (but not vice versa), regardless of whether or not the notion of causal
dependence is applicable. This is enough to apply the central idea that the relevant
counterfactuals are those that (typically asymmetrically) relate changes in the explanans
to changes in the explanandum. For example, in the case of Mother we know how
changes in the number of strawberries changes the system’s divisibility-by-three, and
consequently the possibility of Mother’s success or failure. We thus grasp how Mother’s
success or failure explanatorily depends on the number of strawberries that she has
(and the number of children), but not the other way around. This dependence is ap-
propriately directed. As we indicated earlier, the notion of intervention plays the role
of blocking changes to the explanans that go through changes to the explanandum (or
through a common cause variable, etc.). Similarly, changes to the number of strawber-
ries clearly do not go through changes to the system’s divisibility-by-three, or through
changes to Mother’s success or failure. However, changes to Mother’s success or failure
do go through changes to her number of strawberries (or children). From now on, let
us call the explanatory counterfactuals simply change relating counterfactuals (adapting
Woodward’s use of the term) to keep in mind that they are a strict subset of all counter-
factuals and a broader class than interventionist counterfactuals.22
Since the relevant counterfactuals are selected by focusing on changes to some object
or system, the modal information that we are interested in is tied to the system or object
in question. They are what Woodward calls “same object” counterfactuals”:
Suppose that we wish to explain the behavior of some object or system o.
As the standard view is usually understood, it claims that generalizations
of form “All As are Bs” are explanatory of the behavior of o if they support
counterfactuals of the following form: . . . If some object o∗, dierent from o
and that does not possess property A, were to be an A, then it would be a
B.
Call such counterfactuals “other object” counterfactuals: they describe what
the behavior of objects other than o would be under the counterfactual cir-
cumstances in which they are A. By contrast, according to the view I have
been defending, to count as invariant and hence explanatory with respect to
o, a generalization must support “same object” counterfactuals that describe
how the very object o would behave under an intervention. [Woodward,
2003, 281]
At first glance this may seem to suggest that all of the explanations that we have in
mind must be about specific, particular systems or objects in order for the distinction—
central to the W-H account—between “same object" (SO) and “other object" (OO) coun-
terfactuals to apply. This raises a worry that according to Pincock [2015] rules out the
an answer to a question about what would happen under an intervention, we may have a
noncausal explanation of some sort.
22For more discussion on how to decouple the counterfactual aspect and the causal aspect of Woodward’s
account, see for example Saatsi and Pexton [2013], Saatsi [forthcoming], and Rice [2015]. For a suggestion
of how to recover directionality without causal notions see for example Jansson [forthcoming].
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application of the W-H account to abstract explanations, since some highly abstract ex-
planations do not seem to provide information about any particular object at all (much
less information about changes to any particular object).
In our view, one should not think of the contrast between SO counterfactuals and
OO counterfactuals in the way Pincock does. First, note that even in the case of causal
explanations, most scientific explanations do not have a particular, individual object as
the explanatory target. The explanandum is typically generic (and general even when
couched in language such as ‘the period of a simple pendulum’). The importance of the
distinction between SO and OO counterfactuals lies in the fact that it focuses our at-
tention on the right kind of change relating counterfactuals. When we make use of the
simple pendulum law to explain the period of a simple pendulum, the right counterfac-
tuals to have in mind are those that ask how the period of a generic kind of dynamical
system, viz. simple pendulum, is aected by changing, say, its length.23 Counterfactuals
concerning objects other than simple pendulums do not come into play, even when they
are reasonable and well defined. (It may be true that had a hammer been suspended
around an appropriate pivot with the head down, then we could have used the simple
pendulum law to explain its period, but such OO counterfactuals are not required in
order to explain the period of a simple pendulum.)
Although the W-H account does not apply directly to the case of Königsberg’s bridges,
the central notion of change relating (SO) counterfactuals can be carried over to this case.
This is the work of the next section.
5 Königsberg – Encore!
We will now revisit the Königsberg case to illustrate the above counterfactual account
and its virtues. So far we have mainly criticised Pincock’s and Lange’s motivations for
thinking that there is a sharp distinction between causal explanations and abstract non-
causal explanations, maintaining that one can instead approach both types of explana-
tions in the fundamentally same spirit. We now push for a stronger claim, arguing that
the core claim of the counterfactual account (as we understand it), that explanatoriness
is associated exclusively with the third dimension of abstraction, can be tested against
the alternative viewpoints. This will provide a clear reason to prefer the counterfactual
account.
Let us go back to the 18th c. Königsberg, and ask QK : Why is it impossible to make
a round-tour of Königsberg crossing each of its seven bridges exactly once? An intuitive
explanation-sketch response goes as follows. Clearly each visit of a landmass (‘island’)
requires the use of two bridges: one in, and one out. Else you get stuck. Therefore, in
order for a network of bridges to allow for a round tour—to be ‘tourable’—each island
must have a number of bridges to/from it that is some multiple of two. On the other
hand, if there is one (or more) island(s) with an odd number of bridges to/from it, the
system is not tourable. 18th-century Königsberg had four such troublesome junctions,
rendering a round-tour of Königsberg impossible.
23We can then go further to apply this to explain the period of a particular pendulum that is of the right
kind, e.g. that in my grandfather clock.
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Euler initiated a famed graph-theoretic explanation that makes the above sketch pre-
cise. This is standard material in graph-theory textbooks, illustrating the explanatory use
of mathematical notions (such as connected graph, its vertices, and their degrees).24 But
before we get to the graph-theoretic explanation in its full generality, it is worth aempt-
ing to answer QK without graph theory. In the counterfactual framework explanations
must involve an invariant, change-relating generalisation that supports counterfactuals
indicating an explanatory dependence of the explanandum on the explanans. A general-
isation that thus underwrites an answer to QK could be markedly less abstract and less
general than the graph-theoretic explanation, without thereby being unexplanatory.
As a maer of fact it is easy to find a simple invariant generalisation that furnishes a
non-mathematical answer toQK . Let us focus our aention on the kind of bridge system
that connects exactly four islands, with at most two bridges between any two islands.
Euler’s Königsberg (represented below) is one of these systems.
Figure 1: Königsberg’s bridge system.
There are 395 such bridge systems altogether. We can classify them as follows. Call
a bridge system ‘even’ i each island has an even number of bridges to/from it. In this
particular case, this means that each island must have 2, 4, or 6 bridges to/from it. If a
bridge system is not even, call it ‘odd’. Considering the specific type of bridge system
exhibited by Königsberg, we ask: why is it not tourable? In answering this question
we naturally look for an explanatory generalisation capable of providing suitable modal
information by supporting appropriate, change relating counterfactuals. Focusing our
aention, for now, only on the bridge systems consisting of four connected islands with
at most two bridges between any two islands, a fiing generalisation is not hard to
find: of all these bridge systems, all and only the even ones are tourable.25 This is a
true generalisation about this set of 395 dierent types of bridge systems. It is also a
generalisation that can aord us with a degree of explanatory purchase on QK . That
is, by reference to this generalisation we can begin to answer QK simply by noting that
Königsberg’s bridge system is not tourable, because it is not even; it would be tourable,
if it were odd. Königsberg’s tourability—the feature that is our explanandum—depends
on this high-level physical property of the system.
24It is unsurprising that many authors refer to this explanation as a paradigmatic case of a (distinctly)
mathematical explanation of an empirical fact. In addition to the authors already covered, see e.g. Lyon
[2012].
25This fact about these bridge systems can be in principle established by a variety of means, e.g. by at-
tempting to draw every such system without liing your pen, or by playing with a comprehensive collection
of miniature models of such systems. Geing epistemic access, or representing that fact, in principle need
not involve mathematics. (cf. Saatsi [2011])
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More formally, we can define the following binary variables X and Y :
X = even/odd system
x = 1 : even
x = 0 : odd
Y = (non-)tourable system
x = 1 : tourable
x = 0 : (non-)tourable
The simple explanatory generalization at stake then states that for bridge systems of
this kind—four islands, maximum of two bridges between any pair—it holds that
X = Y
This equation should be read le to right, as indicating an asymmetric dependence of Y -
variable on theX-variable. The tourability (or otherwise) of a bridge system depends on
it being even (or odd). Being even (or odd) does not depend on tourability; it only depends
on the number of bridges. All in all, the explanation naturally fits the counterfactual
framework presented above (§4).
The explanatory generalisation, while narrow, is explanatory nevertheless, even if
minimally so. Undoubtedly, the explanation provided immediately raises further ques-
tions. Why exactly is this generalisation true, for example? What if we start adding or
subtracting ‘islands’? What if we relax the restriction that there are at most two bridges
between any pair of islands? These are obvious further questions, and this clearly ren-
ders the explanation shallow and somewhat contrived, especially in comparison to a
full-blown graph-theoretic account. But none of this diminishes the philosophical sig-
nificance of this explanation. For however minimal and shallow the toy explanation is,
we deem it to have some explanatory power nevertheless, and we maintain that this is
due to the explanation providing modal information of the right sort.26
The shallow explanation above clearly has a degree of abstractness along the three
dimensions introduced in §2. Indeed, the explanation is highly abstract with respect
to the dierent specific material realizations of the bridges (the first dimension), and
also with respect to the underlying laws of physics (the second dimension). As a maer
of fact, the explanation is as abstract along these dimensions as the full-blown graph-
theoretic explanation! Yet the explanation is shallow. This clearly speaks against the idea
26Is minimal explanation of this sort ever completely satisfactory? That depends on the context of the
why-question. Imagine Königsberg without Euler—or any other mathematician for that maer. The King
of Königsberg, annoyed by his failure to do an round-tour of the city, wishes to understand the situation.
“This city must be made thus tourable, at whatever cost!”, he commands, puing his best people to work.
“Well, actually, the less it costs the beer—and we certainly cannot aord more than two bridges between
any two islands!” The King’s minions get to work, and painstakingly demonstrate, by non-mathematical
means, that for any financially feasible set-up of bridges it holds that it is tourable if and only if it is even.
Equipped with this knowledge, they can explain the situation to the King: “What ever you do with the
bridges, make sure the whole system is even, and you will be able to tour it, since tourability depends on
this feature alone (at least for the kinds of bridge systems we can aord).”
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the (minimal) explanatoriness in question springs from abstraction along these lines, as
Pincock and Lange would have it.
With regard to the third dimension of abstractness, the explanatory generalisation
does allow us to answer some change relating what-if-things-had-been-dierent ques-
tions. We have counterfactual information of the right, SO, kind. We can answer coun-
terfactual questions about how the tourability of a generic kind of structural system, viz.
bridge system, is changed by changes to the oddness or evenness of the system (at least
as long as we stay within the constraints of four connected islands and a maximum of
two bridges between any two islands). This is what makes it explanatory, even if shal-
lowly so. Yet, its degree of abstractness along this dimension is very limited. Although
the explanatory generalisation never delivers the wrong answer, the generalisation is sim-
ply silent on what happens in cases of more than four islands or more than two bridges
between some islands. Thus, the explanation using the generalisation breaks down in
these cases.27
In order to understand precisely how the shallow explanation compares in its ab-
stractness to the deeper graph-theoretic explanation, we need to pay aention to the
fact that the variable X concerns a determinable property of the system: it being even or
odd. This determinable property is determined by the bridges’ configuration. There are
various ways for a bridge system to be even. One way is for each island to have (say) 4
bridges to/from it. This is still a determinable property of the system, determined by a
specific way of having 4 bridges to/from each island. (Cf. Figure 2)
Figure 2: Two determinate 4-4-4-4 configurations.
Here is another way for a bridge system to be even: one of the islands has 8 bridges
to/from it, and the other three islands have 2, 2, and 4 bridges to/from them, respectively.
While our generalisation supported some explanatory what-if-things-had-been-dierent
questions, it is simply silent on the system’s tourability if we changeX from odd to even
27Here two dierences between our third dimension of abstraction and (even the extended) notion of
invariance in Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] is important. First, we take the important question to be
whether or not the variations destroy the explanation (not merely the generalisation). The generalisation
itself does not break down. It just does not apply. However, the generalisation not applying destroys the ex-
planation. Although we do not share their accounts in general, we take this focus on the whole explanation
from Potochnik [2010] and Weslake [2010]. Second, the range of variations are understood as the range of
cases in which one of the variables in the explanans can be changed without destroying the explanation.
While this is also the idea of the W-H account, for the discussion in Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b] it
is oen natural to interpret the range of invariance as the range of changes in the variable values for which
the generalisations continue to hold. This can come apart from the range of cases of changing the value of
the variable under which the generalisation (or in our case, the explanation) continues to hold. Our case
above illustrates this.
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by allowing one island to have as many as 8 bridges to/from it. Similarly, it is silent on
what happens if we change X from even to odd by including 7 bridges to/from some
island. To answer what-if-things-had-been-dierent questions corresponding to these
cases, we need a broader generalisation, X = Y , that applies to systems as rich in
bridges as these.
Dierences in the determinate configurations do not explicitly feature as a variable
in the explanatory generalisation X = Y . Indeed, on the face of it the explanatory
generalisation looks the same regardless of the range of determinate what-if-things-had-
been-dierent questions it is taken to support. Dierences in the range of determinate
realizations of evenness/oddness do get into play through the restriction in application.
When we consider changes to the variable (even, odd) these changes have to go through
changes in the bridge system (there is no way to change the evenness of the system
that does not go through changing the specific configurations of the bridges). If we
are justified in taking the generalisation X = Y to apply to systems that have (say) a
maximum of three bridges between any two islands, then our explanation covers a wider
range of conditions directly relevant to changing the value of the explanans variable
X . In particular, we can now also consider what-if-things-had-been-dierent situations
with 7, 8 or 9 bridges to/from some island(s).
In this way we can straightforwardly compare dierent Königsberg explanations
with respect to their degree of abstraction in the third dimension. The explanation where
we restrict the generalisation to a maximum of three bridges between any two islands
applies to all the ways of varying the variable in the explanatory generalisation that
the explanation restricted to a maximum of two bridges covers—and then some! The
full-blown graph-theoretic explanation is, of course, maximally abstract along this third
dimension of abstractness. The explanatory generalisation now covers any (connected)
bridge system of arbitrary many islands and bridges. The graph-theoretic explanation
has considerable depth in contrast to the shallow, non-mathematical explanation. This
is solely due to increased abstraction along the third dimension. The explanatory depen-
dence of the shallow explanation is subsumed under a more general explanatory depen-
dence, enabling us to answer a much wider range of change relating what-if-things-had-
been-dierent questions. The shallow explanation does not contain irrelevant informa-
tion about the nature of the bridges, their material constitution or their length, say, or
about the underlying nomological features, such that the increase in explanatory depth
could be due to abstracting away from such information. Indeed, as already noted, the
explanans of these two explanations are already maximally abstract along the first and
second dimensions, and the considerable increase in the explanatory power should be
aributed solely to the third dimension of abstraction.
6 Conclusion
We have argued that paradigmatic abstract (plausibly) non-causal explanations can be
naturally accommodated with an account that associates explanatoriness with suitable
information about dependence. This improves the prospects of subsuming many ex-
planations under a unified counterfactual framework, opposing the current trend that
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emphasizes the explanatory value of abstraction as a sui generis source of explanatori-
ness. We found the motivations for this trend questionable (§2), leaving room for a more
unified account.
More unified theories are in general oen beer, ceteris paribus, but we are not just
expressing this kind of a prima facie preference for unification. Rather, we motivate
the unified account by the following considerations. First, we argued that the unified
account beer captures intuitions about ‘explanatory depth’. Part of the force behind
the W-H framework comes from the fact that it provides a natural starting point for
capturing intuitions about explanatory goodness (Woodward and Hitchcock [2003a,b]
and Ylikoski and Kuorikoski [2010]). We argued, in the same spirit, that our view-
point can be tested by varying dependence information—the hypothesized source of
explanatoriness—keeping other things fixed (§5). We maintain that our intuitions about
radically varying explanatory power naturally correspond to radically varying amounts
of dependence information, in a way that is diicult to accommodate from the alterna-
tive viewpoints.
Secondly, the unified account has a further virtue worth flagging. This has to do with
dissolving diicult questions facing the more disjunctive accounts that regard abstract
explanations fundamentally dierent from causal explanations in their explanatoriness.
Noting that causal explanations also typically abstract away from a huge amount of
physical detail raises a question about Pincock’s point of view, for example: What ex-
plains the distinct qualitative dierence between causal explanations that exhibit a de-
gree of abstraction along each of the three dimensions, on the one hand, and the sui
generis ‘abstract explanations’, on the other? Is there a ‘threshold’ of abstraction above
which the counterfactual conception fails, despite capturing abstract causal explanations
so well?
A similar question can be raised for Lange’s account. Many causal explanations also
abstract away from a huge amount of underlying nomological detail.28 Thus, all causal
explanations that incorporate a degree of abstraction along the second dimension of
abstraction also show how the explanandum is, to a corresponding degree, ‘necessary to
a stronger degree of necessity’ by virtue of showing the irrelevance of some of the actual
laws involved. So why is it that such modal information becomes explanatory in a sui
generis way in connection with abstract non-causal explanations? Or is it the case that
such modal information always contributes to the explanatory power, but it contributes
in a dierent way when an explanation abstracts away from (almost) all nomological
information, as in the case of ‘mathematical’ explanations?29 Whence the dierence?
Why do abstract non-causal explanations explain so dierently—in Salmon’s ‘modal’
mode—from causal explanations that incorporate a degree of similar abstraction?
Such questions have not been considered, never mind answered, by Pincock and
28Recall the discussion in §2 of the gravitational pendulum explanation, which does not depend on the
actual nomological structure underlying ‘gravitational force’. (A world with action-at-a-distance Newtonian
gravitational force has a dierent law governing that force, from general relativistic world with no such
force.) Also, a causal equilibrium explanation of why a ball ends up at the boom of a bowl can abstract
away from the specifics of the actual gravitational force law, and even from the specific proportionality of
force and acceleration in Newton’s second law. And so on.
29Almost all, since these explanations still contain information associated with the various contingent
facts presupposed by the why question.
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Lange. A more unified account has the virtue of allowing us to side step these issues
entirely. According to this account the paradigmatic abstract explanations, despite their
non-causal character, are explanatory for the fundamentally same reason as causal ex-
planations are. In both cases the explanatory power springs from counterfactual infor-
mation of the same sort, and the paradigmatic exemplars of abstract explanations need
not be regarded as sui generis.
Appendix
At the start of section §2 we cited four exemplars of abstract, plausibly non-causal, math-
ematical explanations that have featured prominently in the philosophical literature. We
have covered two of these in depth in the main text; here we briefly cover the remaining
two.
Economical bees. Why do bees build hexagonal honeycombs? Answer: because it is
the most resource-eicient way to build them. That is, there is an evolutionary fitness ad-
vantage associated with the neural architecture responsible for hexagonal honeycombs.
This has to do with the geometrical fact that hexagonal grid uses the least total perime-
ter in dividing a planar region into regions of equal area. Lange [2013, 500] notes that
“this explanation works by describing the relevant features of the selection pressures
that have historically been felt by honeybees, so it is an ordinary, causal explanation,
not distinctively mathematical.” (It is perhaps worth noting further that this causal ex-
planation is quite abstract in dimensions one and two: the causal facts described are
rather independent of the actual microphysical structures of honeycombs, as well as the
microphysical causal laws.)
Lange [2013, 500] goes on to specify a dierent, related explanandum that has a
non-causal (‘distinctively mathematical’) abstract explanation:
But suppose we narrow the explanandum to the fact that in any scheme to
divide their combs into regions of equal area, honeybees would use at least
the amount of wax they would use in dividing their combs into hexagons
of equal area (assuming combs to be planar regions and the dividing walls
to be of negligible thickness). This fact has a distinctively mathematical
explanation: it is just an instance of the Honeycomb Conjecture.
That is, the question is: why does the hexagonal grid minimize the total amount of mate-
rial needed to cover the perimeter? According to Lange this is explained as an ‘immedi-
ate application’ of the mathematical fact stated by the Honeycomb Conjecture, showing
the explanandum to be mathematically necessary—independent of any dynamical and
causal laws involved (e.g. by governing the materials that bees use and how they use it,
or shaping the actual evolutionary trajectory).
We agree that there is an abstract, plausibly non-causal explanation here, but our
analysis of the (minimally) explanatory application of the Honeycomb Conjecture is dif-
ferent from Lange’s, as follows. The amount of wax needed is clearly directly propor-
tional to the volume to be covered. (This just follows from the meaning of ‘amount’
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in this context.) The volume to be covered is clearly directly proportional to the total
perimeter of the comb-dividing walls. (We can assume this in the context of the question
as presented.) It is a geometrical fact about honeycomb-like systems that they minimize
the total perimeter (and thus the volume required for construction) if and only if they
divide the planar regions into regular hexagons. (The Honeycomb Conjecture represents
this fact about physical space.) The amount of wax needed for construction depends on
the geometry of such systems. The dependence is plausibly not causal. Having the prop-
erty of minimizing the amount of wax needed for construction, in particular, depends on
the hexagonal structure. We explain by providing information about this dependence.
The explanatory generalisation involved is very simple. Let’s fix a range of possible
honeycomb structures by specifying the average comb area, as well as the total area cov-
ered by the whole honeycomb. Then it is the case that a (regular) hexagon honeycomb
requires some specific amount of wax, V , and it is also the case that any alternative hon-
eycomb requires more wax than this. This explanatory generalisation answers a range of
what-if-things-had-been-dierent questions regarding the amount of wax required, by
eectively relating two explanans variable values (hexagonal vs. non-hexagonal) to a bi-
nary explanandum variable (minimizing vs. non-minimizing). This generalisation allows
us to answer a huge range of what-if-things-had-been-dierent questions, since the ex-
planans variable non-hexagonal concerns a determinable property that corresponds to
an infinite number of determinate non-hexagonal shapes. There is thus a sense in which
the explanation is highly abstract in the third dimension of abstraction. The explanation
nevertheless feels quite minimal, because there is no interesting paern of dependence
(unlike in the Königsberg case).
Similar abstract explanations are very easy to come by. Why are soap bubbles (in still
air) spherical? Because the molecular dynamics of soap-film is area-minimizing: bubbles
tend towards a shape that minimizes the area containing the air inside. But why is it the
spherical soap bubble, of all possible soap bubbles, that minimizes the volume-containing
surface area? Taking the relevant geometrical facts to be appropriately represented in
Euclidean geometry by the isoperimetric inequality in three dimensions explains this by
revealing how soap bubbles’ property of minimal surface-area-to-volume ratio depends
on their spherical shape.
Plateau’s laws. There are much fancier facts about soap bubbles, of course, that we
can take as the explanandum. We might, for instance, focus on Joseph Plateau’s experi-
mentally established laws for any configuration of soap bubbles, with or without a rigid
frame. One of the laws says, for example, that there are only two ways for soap films
to intersect: three surfaces can intersect along a curve, meeting at equal angles of 120◦
degrees, or four surfaces can intersect at a point, meeting at around 109◦ degrees. What
explains this regularity of all ‘Plateau configurations’?
There is no deep dierence between the explanation of this regularity, and the expla-
nation of the regularity concerning the approximately spherical shape of isolated soap
bubbles. Both regularities are a result of the area-minimizing tension of the soap-film.
We can then further ask why the bubble configurations that do minimize the surface
area exhibit the geometrical regularities in question, such as Plateau’s law above. The
answer to the further question is an abstract, non-causal explanation, revealing how
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the property of minimizing the surface area depends on the configuration geometry
(‘shape’), partly specified by the intersection types and angles. The explanatory regular-
ity is again simple: a binary explanandum variable (area-minimizing vs. non-minimizing)
depends on the value of a determinable explanans variable (Plateau-configuration vs. non-
Plateau-configuration). This is a true generalisation about soap bubbles (and other area-
minimizing systems) that supports an explanation of Plateau’s laws by answering a
range of change relating what-if-things-had-been-dierent questions. What if things
were dierent so that the surface intersection angles did not comply to Plateau’s law?
Then the configuration would not minimize the surface area. Given that the physics
of soap molecules causes the bubbles to minimize their area, Plateau’s laws are thus
explained as a (non-causal) consequence of area-minimization.30
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